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My primary aim in this essay is to clarify the notion of a moral reason. To accomplish this, 
I criticise in the first section the main conceptions of moral reasons. In the second and 
third section, I explain my account of moral reasons, arguing that moral reasons are a kind 
of social reasons, and illustrate it by examples. Although the concept of a moral reason is 
central to our moral thinking; it has received scant attention in the philosophical literature. 
Furthermore, it is a very unclear notion and causes confusions in ethical debates. It has al-
ways been an objective of analytic moral philosophy to clarify perplexing notions, and this 





In this paper, I aim to clarify the notion of a moral reason. Specifically, the 
question I have been addressing is when does someone present a moral rea-
son for something rather than, for instance, a prudential or legal one. There 
are, of course, many other questions about moral reasons that are worth con-
sidering as for example whether they are overriding, whether there are differ-
ent kinds of moral reasons, or whether they are necessarily motivating. Some 
have investigated moral reasons from the logical point of view and have, for 
instance, asked whether moral reasons are a special kind of reasons or 
whether there are special rules of inference for moral reasoning. In this essay, 
I do not deal with the logical problem of moral reasons and throughout this 
paper I am assuming that the examples I give are indeed reasons. My aim is 
rather to determine the conditions that render such reasons moral reasons. 
‘Reason’ can be taken in a justificatory or explanatory sense.1 In this study, I 
am dealing with justifying reasons. I am not concerned with the problem of 
moral motivation. Often we use the term ‘moral’ evaluatively (the opposite of 
moral is then immoral), but we also speak of moral problems, moral emo-
tions, or moral motives in a way that is not evaluative. We mean, then, that 
                                                 
1 For instance, Skorupski (1997) holds that ‘considerations whose absence from a person’s mind are blame-
worthy are moral reasons’ (p. 350). It is, however, clear that he uses ‘reason’ in an explanatory sense because 




these things belong to the realm of morality and not, for instance, to law or 
convention. The opposite of moral is then non-moral (or amoral). It is this lat-
ter use of ‘moral’ that concerns us here. My problem is to demarcate moral 
reasons from other kinds of reasons and not to make normative ethical 
claims. 
We make the distinction between moral and non-moral reasons quite natu-
rally in our ordinary ethical thinking. Many claim that they are against abor-
tion for moral reasons, some argue that the USA had a moral reason to in-
vade Iraq while others hold their reasons were purely selfish; and even in our 
ordinary daily decisions we feel that we may have prudential reasons for some-
thing but moral reasons against it. This shows that the distinction between 
moral and non-moral reasons is woven into our moral thinking. It is, however, 
nevertheless obvious that we do not have a clear notion of moral reasons. It 
has always been an objective of (analytic) ethics to remove perplexities of our 
moral thinking by clarifying central concepts of morality. This paper attempts 
to contribute to this goal. 
To this aim, I will in the first section present and criticise the main concep-
tions of moral reasons. In the second section, I explain my view of what 
makes simple reasons moral reasons, which I will then expand to complex 
moral reason in the third section. It has often been held that moral reasoning 
is a species of practical reasoning, that is, a type of reasoning directed towards 
what to do. Even though this is an oversimplification because we can, for ex-
ample, give moral reasons also for motives, I will confine myself in this paper 
to moral reasons for or against actions. I wish, however, to emphasize that my 
account can be extended to other kinds of reasons also. 
1. Critique of Main Conceptions of Moral Reasons 
Some authors seem to think that the concept of a moral reason is so clear that 
there is no need for elucidation.2 Others are aware that it is an elusive notion 
and try to clarify it. In what follows, I shall present and criticizes these concep-
tions of moral reasons. This section will also provide the background for my 
own account of moral reasons. 
(1) It seems that the paradigm of moral reasoning is reasoning from moral 
principles.3 Such principles can explicitly state that some kind of action is 
morally right or wrong. For instance, when somebody reasons that the death 
penalty should not be outlawed because it reduces the murder rate and what-
ever reduces the murder rate is morally right. This reasoning refers to the al-
                                                 
2 See, for instance, Dancy (2000, 49) for whom it seems obvious that ‘Since she was alone and in trouble, he 
should have offered help’ is moral reasoning. Similar also Audi (2001, 163) or Postow (2005). 
3 See, for example, Nelson (1999), Toulmin (1976, 106), or Wallace (1997). 
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leged moral principle that actions are (prima facie) right if they reduce the 
murder rate. The form of our reasoning is the same when we justify an action 
using other moral principles, for instance, the Principle of Utility. Often, how-
ever, such principles do not explicitly claim that some actions are morally 
right; among them are Kant’s Categorical Imperative, the Golden Rule, D. 
Ross’ prima facie principles, or the principle of non-maleficence (“above all, 
do not harm”). My objection applies to both kinds of such principles. 
For at least three reasons, it seems to me obvious that this account is inade-
quate. (i) Stating moral principles need not yield a reason at all. The pious 
Muslim Ali berates his workmate Mahmoud for having lunch because it is 
Ramadan. ‘You should not eat between sunrise and sunset in Ramadan’ is for 
Ali (at least intuitively) a moral principle. But the atheist Mahmoud does not 
care about Islam and therefore Ali does not give him a reason against having 
lunch. That one should fast in Ramadan, is for Ali a moral reason to abstain 
from having lunch but it is no reason for Mahmoud and therefore it is for him 
a fortiori no moral reason. 
(ii) Even if a moral principle gives somebody a reason to do something, this 
reason need not be a moral one. If Paul reasons that he should return a book 
because he has promised to do so, he has, according to Ross (1930) and many 
others, presented a moral reason for returning the book. But this need not be 
the case. Paul valued promise keeping and therefore he had a reason to return 
the book. But the explanation for his valuing promise keeping may be such 
that this reason does not qualify as a moral reason. Psychological research 
shows that our valuations can be acquired in many different ways.4 As a child, 
Paul might have been consistently punished for breaking his promises and re-
warded for keeping them. Such a process of conditioning can induce a deep 
aversion against breaking promises. I think it is evident that he did not give a 
moral reason for returning the books if this conditioning caused his desire to 
return it. As will be argued in the next section, reasons need to have a special 
genesis to count as moral reasons and Paul’s reason for returning the book 
may not have the right origin. 
(iii) So called moral principles make simple moral reasons indistinguishable 
from simple non-moral reasons. Let us change the situation in (ii) slightly. 
Again, Paul argues for returning the book by stating that he has promised to 
return it. But he wants to keep his promise because he knows that the library 
does not lend any books to those who do not return them promptly. He is 
anxious to avoid this because he needs the book for his research. I think we 
can aptly say that Paul has now a prudential reason for keeping his promise. 
However, Paul could desire to keep his promise because he knows that other 
students need the book and he is anxious to avoid problems for them. I think 
                                                 
4 See e.g. Eagly and Chaiken (1993). 
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most will agree that Paul has now a moral reason to return the book. From 
this it follows that ‘because I have promised to ϕ’ is sometimes a moral reason 
and sometimes not. But if we hold that reasoning from the principle of prom-
ise-keeping (or any other ‘moral principle’) renders reasons moral reasons, we 
cannot make this distinction, and different kinds of reasons become indistin-
guishable. However, since there is a clear distinction between simple moral 
and prudential reasons, the account currently under consideration cannot be 
adequate. 
This is not to say that reference to the Golden Rule or any other moral 
principle never gives someone a moral reason for doing something. What I 
hold is rather that referring to such principles does not necessarily constitute a 
moral reason and that the essence of moral reasons must therefore be sought 
somewhere else. 
(2) Some take the view that we reason morally when we give a reason for a 
moral judgement.5 When we say ‘Smith is a despicable person because he 
tends to ignore people’s feelings’ and assume that ‘Smith is a despicable per-
son’ is a moral judgement, then, according to this view, ‘he tends to ignore 
people’s feelings’ is a moral reason (Beardsmore, 1969, ix). 
There is, however, an obvious objection to this view. Even if we concede 
that the judgements are indeed moral judgements, a reason given for them 
need not be a moral reason. If we assume that ‘I should not murder’ is a 
moral judgement, I can give many different reasons for it. ‘Because I might 
face the death penalty’ and ‘because it is unlawful’ are only two of them, the 
first may be prudential the second a legal one. A reason for a moral judge-
ment is therefore not necessarily a moral reason.  
A reply to this objection might be that a reason for judgements that state 
explicitly that an action is (prima facie or all things considered) morally right 
or wrong, must be a moral reason. But this view is also not tenable. John, an 
ethical egoist, holds that an action is morally right iff it is in his best interests. 
That he benefits from ϕ-ing more than from any other alternative, is therefore 
a reason for his moral judgement that he should do ϕ . Hardly anyone, how-
ever, would agree that this self-interested reason is a moral reason. And those 
who accept egoistic reasons as moral reasons can be confronted with much 
weirder moralities. Jane may hold that an action is morally right iff it is done 
on Mondays. This renders the reason that ϕ was done on a Monday a moral 
reason. Since anything can be regarded as morally right, anything can be a 
moral reason, if we accept the view under consideration. In general, the kind 
of judgement for which a reason is given can never determine the kind of rea-
son for this judgement. 
(3) A variant of the account discussed in (2) is the view that moral reasons 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Beardsmore (1969), Gillett (2003), or Thomson (1999, 10-13). 
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are reasons for resolutions of moral problems. L. Kohlberg and his school 
have conceptualised moral reasons in this way. These moral psychologists ask 
their subjects to judge cases which are intuitively classified as moral dilemmas 
because they involve a conflict of interests. The subjects are then asked how a 
certain problem should be resolved and why they think so. Their justifications 
for what should be done in a given case are considered to be moral reasons.6 
An investigation of this kind of moral psychological research shows, how-
ever, that the subjects give reasons of different kinds. Some are egoistic, some 
are prudential or legal, and some may indeed qualify as moral reasons. This 
shows that even if the problems these subjects are confronted with are moral 
problems, the reasons why they should be resolved in a certain way need not 
therefore be moral reasons, in the same way that a justification for moral 
judgements need not be a moral justification. 
(4) In popular religious thinking, morality and religion are inseparable and 
God is seen as the foundation of morality. In a theistically viewed world, the 
paradigm of a moral reason seems therefore a reason based on God’s will. 
For instance, Brown (1966) claims that saying ‘If God commands something, 
then it is right to be done’ is pleonastic (p. 158). Reasoning such as ‘I should 
donate money to charities because God endorses it’ or ‘I must not murder as 
God condemns it’ seem thus to be clear cases of moral reasoning. 
As I see it, however, such religiously grounded reasoning is not ipso facto 
moral reasoning. The problem of this kind of reasoning was first pinpointed 
by Socrates who asks in Plato’s Euthyphro whether an action is right because 
the gods will it or whether the gods will it because it is right. In our present 
context, the first alternative (that something is right because God wills it) is the 
relevant one. Among its problems is the well-known consequence that any-
thing could be right as long as God wills it, which was apparently accepted by 
William Ockham. For present purposes, however, I wish to emphasize an-
other problem of religiously grounded reasoning. When I reason that I 
should not murder because God condemns it, I value the proposition that 
God condemns murder (if I did not, this proposition would not be a reason 
for me against murder). If I value it I do so for a certain (explanatory) reason. 
I might hold that when I do things that are condemned by God, I may end up 
in hell; and it may be this belief that explains my concern about what is con-
demned by God. In this case, I present a prudential reason against murdering 
someone but clearly not a moral one, despite my reference to God. Since 
there are reasons based on God’s will that are not moral reasons, and since 
there are obviously moral reasons that are not based on God’s will, it is nei-
ther sufficient nor necessary for a moral reason to be religiously grounded. 
(5) Some seem to hold that if a reason refers to so called thick concepts 
                                                 
6 See Bebeau et al. (1995), Colby & Kohlberg (1987), Muhlberger (2000), and Spielthenner (1996). A similar 
view has been held by Horty (2003). 
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such as cruel, callous, just, or brave, it is necessarily a moral reason.7 Two 
simple examples will suffice to show that this view is not tenable. 
(i) The soldiers Jones and Smith have tortured a prisoner of war. Jones 
says, ‘We shouldn’t have electrocuted him because that was cruel.’ Jones dis-
values their cruel treatment of the prisoner, otherwise he would not have given 
a reason against their action by saying ‘that was cruel’. But since he can dis-
value their cruelty on different grounds, his reason need not be a moral one. 
Suppose that Jones knew that their superiors would not tolerate torturing de-
tainees and that he would get into trouble if it became known that they treated 
a captive cruelly. If this belief caused Jones’ disvaluing their cruelty, he gave a 
self-interested reason but not a moral one. 
(ii) But are not justice reasons necessarily morals reasons for doing some-
thing? Again, what I deny is the ‘necessarily’. I do not doubt that we often give 
moral reasons when we refer to justice. But the point is that we do not always 
do so and this shows that it is not the reference to justice as such that makes a 
reason a moral reason. Let us take one example to illustrate this. 
James discusses with his friend the problem of just income taxation and 
takes the view that all incomes should be taxed equally. James holds a strictly 
egalitarian conception of justice, according to which all benefits and burdens 
are to be distributed equally. I am not considering here whether this view is 
economically reasonable but whether James presents necessarily a moral rea-
son when he says, ‘Our taxation system should be changed because it is un-
just.’ The answer, I submit, is that we do not know whether ‘because it is un-
just’ is a moral reason as long as we do not know why James disvalues unjust 
(i.e. unequal) taxation. He may disvalue inequality intrinsically. As already 
mentioned, there is much research in moral psychology (and other branches 
of psychology) about the problem of why people value something. According 
to this research, it is possible that someone disvalues inequality because of 
early conditioning and disvalues it therefore for its own sake. 
An analogy may help. We can learn to disvalue inequality similarly as we 
can learn to disvalue unpunctuality. Some people disvalue unpunctuality in-
trinsically (they just dislike it) and some disvalue injustice (more precisely, 
what they mean by ‘injustice’) intrinsically. Now, it seems to me obvious that if 
someone argues, ‘I must hurry now because I shouldn’t be late’ he does not 
give a moral reason if he just dislikes being late (that is, disvalues unpunctu-
ality intrinsically). For the same reason, someone does not give a moral justifi-
cation when he says, ‘Our taxation system should be changed because it is un-
just’ when he disvalues injustice (in our example inequality) intrinsically. To 
value principles of justice intrinsically is principle worship rather than moral 
                                                 




I do not doubt that James’ reason can be moral. Let us assume that he is 
convinced that equal taxation leads to an egalitarian society and he believes 
that it is best for people to live in such a society. In this case, he does give a 
moral reason, as will become apparent below. The point I wish to make here 
is that the fact that someone refers to justice in the reason he gives does not 
ipso facto make this reason a moral one. If I am right about this, reasons are 
not moral reasons because they are based on thick concepts, and it was only 
this what I wanted to argue for here. This remark applies to all views consid-
ered in this section. All proposed reasons (from moral principles, for moral 
judgements, for a resolution of moral dilemmas, etc.) can be moral reasons. 
What I have tried to show is that no such reason is necessarily and always a 
moral reason. If this is correct, it follows that ‘moral reason’ cannot be defined 
as has been proposed by these authors. 
2. Simple Moral Reasons 
The aim of this section is to determine what renders reasons moral reasons. 
Our moral reasoning is usually complex. It involves separate strands of rea-
sons often leading to separate conclusions. In this section, I will explain when 
a simple reason is a moral reason. The next section deals then with complex 
moral reasons. The basic idea of what makes a practical reason a moral rea-
son is fairly simple: Moral reasons are grounded in the valuations of others 
and it is this genesis that renders them moral reasons. 
Obviously, this needs elaboration and refinement. Let us first consider an 
example. ‘Doctors who attend elderly people in nursing homes often pre-
scribe tranquillizers to keep these people immobile. This practice must stop 
as it impairs the health of the patients.’9 This is a reason against prescribing 
tranquillizers to elderly people in nursing homes. The premises consist of two 
different elements: beliefs and a valuation. The belief is that doctors who at-
tend elderly people in nursing homes often prescribe tranquillizers to keep 
these people immobile, and what the reasoner disvalues is the presumptive 
fact that this practice impairs the health of the patients. 
I am not committed here to the view that a practical reason is a belief-and-
desire complex, but I do hold that it is a necessary condition for a moral rea-
son to contain a valuation. This is a widely shared view, even though the ter-
                                                 
8 Extreme forms of this kind of intrinsic valuations of justice are exemplified by the Habsburg emperor Ferdi-
nand I who justified wars by his motto ‘fiat iustitia et pereat mundus’ (Let justice be done, though the heavens 
fall) and Heinrich von Kleist whose nineteenth century narrative Michael Kohlhaas depicts a man who values 
justice for its own sake and above all else which turns him into a robber and a murderer. 
9 As most other examples, this reasoning is not valid. But the logical assessment of moral reasoning is not my 
concern in this paper. 
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minology varies. Some prefer to speak of desires10 or attitudes11 or use other 
terms.12 But these are only different ways of saying the same thing, namely, 
that practical reasons need a valuational premise. In our example, it is in my 
view clear that the reasoner would not have justified his view that the practice 
of prescribing tranquillizers must stop if he had not disvalued its purported 
consequence. Assume that he claims that he wants the prescription of these 
drugs to be stopped because it impairs the health of the patients. We say, 
‘Surely, you are against their impairment’ and he replies, ‘Not at all, I don’t 
care about it.’ We would not know what to make of this and would probably 
assume that he has a hidden reason against this practice (something he really 
values). Of course, this is not a proof for the view that practical reasons must 
include a valuational element. I am not, however, dealing here with the prob-
lem of practical reasons in general and therefore I can somewhat dogmatically 
assert that a valuation is a necessary condition for every practical reason and 
therefore a fortiori for moral reasons (in the sense considered in this paper). 
These valuations have an explanation and it is this explanatory reason that 
distinguishes moral reasons from other kinds of practical reasons. Let ‘C’ 
stand for what is (dis)valued by the reasoner. We can then specify what kind 
of explanation a reasoner’s valuation must have if a reason he presents is to be 
a moral reason. 
The explanation for a reasoner’s (dis)valuing C is his belief that C is 
(could be) related to something that is (will be or could be) (dis)valued 
by others. 
Let me explain this by referring to the given example. (1) The reasoner dis-
values the putative fact that the health of patients is impaired. This negative 
valuation has an explanation. According to the proposed principle, this expla-
nation is an explanatory reason. Some of our valuations are purely caused. 
Psychological research indicates, for example, that some of our odour prefer-
ences are biologically determined (Moncrieff, 1966) and Brandt (1998) holds 
that our aversion to spiders and snakes may be caused by evolution. If valua-
tions are only causally determined, a reason containing such a valuation can-
not count as a moral reason. A simple example can illustrate this. ‘The condi-
tions under which animals are raised for food are appalling and must there-
fore be changed.’ Assume that the reasoner’s negative valuation of these con-
ditions is caused by the stench on a poultry farm (without involving any belief 
e.g. about the welfare of the animals). We would not then say that he gave a 
moral reason for changing these conditions. 
The valuations can have more than one explanation and usually they do. I 
                                                 
10 For example Audi (2004) or Broad (1985).  
11 See, for instance, Stevenson (1944) or Davidson (2001). 
12 Such as ‘interest’, ‘preference’, ‘utility’, ‘intention’, ‘purpose’, ‘aspirations’, ‘wants’, ‘plans’, ‘ideals’, or ‘aims’. 
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can disvalue the impairment of patients in nursery homes because I feel pity 
for them, but also because I expect to be among them one day and do not 
want to be impaired. Different explanations yield different reasons. At this 
point, however, I am dealing with simple reasons, that is, reasons which have 
only one explanation. 
(2) The reasoner must believe that what he (dis)values is related to some-
thing (e.g. a state or event) that others (dis)value. This relation can be of dif-
ferent kinds. It can be causal, as in our example where taking tranquillizers is 
believed to cause health impairment, or non-causal e.g. deductive, inductive, 
mereological, and in trivial cases of moral reasoning, it is the identity relation. 
In ‘I should not play the piano in the evenings because it keeps my neighbour 
from sleeping’, I disvalue the proposition that my playing the piano keeps my 
neighbour from sleeping. This, however, is identical to what another person 
(my neighbour) disvalues. In such cases the explanation why the reasoner 
(dis)values C is his belief that C is something that is or could be (dis)valued by 
others. 
(3) I need not be sure that this relation holds. Very often we believe that it 
could hold or that there is a certain probability for it. ‘I should not play the pi-
ano because it could disturb my neighbour’ is also a moral reason (given that 
the other conditions are met), and for morally sensitive persons, even slight 
chances can yield reasons for doing or omitting something. 
(4) The reasoner believes that C is related to something that is (dis)valued 
by others. The ‘others’ can be anyone who is believed to be capable of valuing 
something. It is not required that others are indeed able to value; what is nec-
essary is only that the reasoner justifiably believes they are. If Nancy argues 
that she should feed her dog on hamburgers because it (literally) likes them 
and she has some justification for this belief, she has a moral reason to do so 
whether or not dogs are really able to value something. For a moral reason, at 
least one other must be involved, but the reasoner can refer to many others if 
they are taken collectively. If we care about elderly people in nursing homes 
collectively, their impaired health yields a reason for opposing prescription of 
tranquillizers. 
This point is central for my conception. In my view, morality is essentially 
social and a moral reason is necessarily a social reason, i.e. a reason that is so-
cially grounded. Most of my objections in the first section are made on this 
basis. Any practical reason becomes a moral reason if it can be shown that it is 
socially grounded, and any allegedly moral reason can be shown not to be a 
moral reason if it can be shown that it is not socially grounded. It is a good ex-
ercise to apply this rule to the examples given in this paper. 
It is worth noting that the valuation of others need not be a moral one. Jane 
is looking for a birthday gift for her husband. She knows that he likes Schu-
bert’s Wanderer Fantasy and she knows also that he thinks Maurizio Pollini’s 
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interpretation is the best. That settles it for her. Her reason is based on an aes-
thetic valuation of her husband but it is nevertheless a moral reason. Also, 
whether others value something absolutely, or comparatively (prefer one out-
come to the other), or whether they value it intrinsically or instrumentally does 
not matter. It is even irrelevant whether their valuation is deviant, regrettable, 
or indecent. If I think that John wants another shot of heroin and needs some 
money for the drug, this can provide me with a moral reason to give him the 
money. It may well be that I have better reasons against giving him the money 
and that it is (seen overall) morally wrong and morally reprehensible to fund 
his addiction, but this is not the point here. We must be careful not to confuse 
the meta-ethical sense of ‘moral’ with the normative ethical sense. 
(5) To give a moral reason, it is not required that we are sure that others 
value the consequences of our action. It is sufficient to believe they could 
value them. ‘I shouldn’t ask her about her late husband as this may make her 
sad’ is moral reasoning (given the other requirements are met); and if I conjec-
ture that this will make her sad, I have also given a moral reason. This means 
that the believed potential and future valuations of others can also make a rea-
son a moral reason. We often have combinations of possibilities: ‘I should not 
play the piano because my neighbour might hear me and, if he does, he may 
feel disturbed’ is also moral reasoning. 
If the valuational element of a reason has an explanation as outlined, we 
can say that this reason is socially grounded, and my account of moral reasons 
can be succinctly expressed as follows: 
S’s reason for doing x is a moral reason iff it is socially grounded.13 
In other words, a moral reason is a social reason and to reason morally is to 
reason socially (in the outlined sense).14 
There is an obvious objection to the view proposed here. It has been held that 
what is really relevant for moral reasons is whether our actions are ‘objectively’ 
good or bad for others and not the valuations of others. In other words, what 
renders reasons moral reasons does not depend on the others’ valuations but 
on the consequences of actions which are (believed to be) good or bad for 
them. We touch here on a problem of value theory that has occupied much 
of the metaethical debate in the last century. There is not room here for a full-
scale discussion of this problem. My present object is, rather, to outline my 
reasons against this view. 
The fact that an action has positive consequences on others need not give 
                                                 
13 Of course, also reasons which someone gives against doing x are moral reasons iff they are socially 
grounded. 
14 I wish to emphasize that this definition is precising or reforming. That is, it is intended to make the meaning 
of a term, which is already used in ordinary language but has not a clear meaning, more precise and herewith 
the term more useful. 
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the reasoner a moral reason because he may not know or believe this. The 
fact that my playing the piano makes the life of my neighbour objectively bet-
ter is not a reason for me to play it, if I neither know nor believe this. This 
means that, to obtain some plausibility, the view under consideration must be 
that something is believed to be good or bad for others. 
However, the example of Pollini’s Schubert interpretation shows that we 
can give moral reasons without believing that the consequences of our actions 
are ‘objectively’ good for others. Jane had a moral reason because her reason-
ing was based on her husband’s valuation and not because she thought that 
buying Pollini’s Schubert CD would be ‘objectively’ good for him. From this it 
follows logically that it is not a necessary condition for a moral reason that the 
consequences of an action are believed to be good or bad for others; and this 
implies that this is not an essential feature of moral reasons. 
At this point, I can now argue against a conception of moral reasons which 
I have not yet mentioned. Some identify moral reasons with other-regarding 
or altruistic reasons and mean by ‘other-regarding’ the intention to benefit 
other persons. Stoljar (1980), who holds this view, asks us to suppose that we 
know that X will make another person A miserable and claims ‘here you may 
refrain from X-ing for … a moral reason … in that A’s welfare happens to be 
important to you’ (p. 29). But the welfare of others can be important for many 
reasons and we can intend to benefit others on many grounds. If X intends to 
benefit A, his intention can be based on his desire to make A dependent on 
him, in which case his reason ‘I should ϕ because this benefits A’ is clearly not 
a moral reason. There may be a more charitable interpretation of what these 
authors mean. For instance, Blum (1980) states explicitly that altruism is ‘a re-
gard for the good of another person, for its own sake’ (pp. 9-10). But even if 
we interpret ‘other-regarding’ and ‘altruistic’ in this sense, we are still left with 
the problem that a moral reason need not be based on the good or welfare of 
others. This means that conceptualising moral reasons as altruistic reasons is 
too narrow. Every altruistic reason is a moral reason, but not every moral rea-
son is an altruistic reason. 
3. Complex Moral Reasons 
Thus far I have dealt with single reasons. As I have already mentioned, our 
reasoning is usually complex involving different strands of reasons. The object 
of this section is to outline my view as to when such extended reasoning can 
be called moral reasoning. Two distinctions can make my discussion clearer. 
We can first distinguish between equivalent and ambivalent reasoning. This 
distinction seems to me quite natural because our reasoning often consists of 
reasons for an action and reasons against it. In this case, I call it ambivalent. If 
all reasons are for something or all are against it, I call the reasoning equiva-
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lent. Second, if all reasons of a complex reasoning are of the same kind (e.g. 
legal, prudential, or moral), I call the reasoning homogenous; if they are of 
different kinds, I call it heterogeneous. Based on these classifications, we can 
distinguish four different kinds of complex moral reasoning, which I shall now 
briefly explain. I shan’t be able to consider complicated reasons and I have to 
restrict myself to the simplest form of complex reasoning, that is, moral rea-
soning consisting of only two reasons. However, I wish to emphasize that my 
exposition can easily be extended to more complicated reasons. 
(1) A homogeneous-ambivalent reason consists of reasons for and against 
an action (that makes it ambivalent), but all reasons are of the same kind (thus 
it is homogeneous). Suppose that a person A argues for toughening the laws 
that regulate the emissions of greenhouse gases. Her reasoning consists of the 
following two reasons: (i) A believes that tightening up on greenhouse gas 
emissions could prevent a change in the earth’s climate and that future genera-
tions would suffer from such a change. By hypothesis, their suffering explains 
why she disvalues climate change. A gives therefore a (simple) moral reason 
for tightening up on the emission of these gases. (ii) However, A is aware that 
tougher laws may hurt the economy and that this may be to the disadvantage 
of many people now living who may lose their jobs. Since the problems of 
these people also count intrinsically for A, she has also a (simple) moral rea-
son against advocating tougher laws. 
Even though A has a reason for and against a certain policy, which makes it 
more difficult for her to work out a rational decision, it is easy to determine 
when complex reasoning of this kind is moral reasoning. It is moral iff all rea-
sons it consists of are moral reasons. 
(2) In homogeneous-equivalent reasoning, all reasons are of the same kind 
and all of them are either for or against an action. Let us change our example 
slightly and assume that A gives the following reasons for toughening the laws 
regulating emissions of greenhouse gases: (i) She still holds that if they are not 
tightened up, future generations will suffer hardship. As already mentioned, A 
therefore has a moral reason for promoting a change of these laws. (ii) In ad-
dition, A believes that people in developing countries especially would suffer 
from the rise in temperature of the earth’s atmosphere, and this also counts 
for her intrinsically. She has, therefore, a further reason to support tougher 
laws. Her reasoning is homogeneous because both reasons are moral, and 
since both reasons are for toughening the laws, they are equivalent; her rea-
soning is thus homogeneous-equivalent. 
This kind of homogeneous reasoning is moral reasoning iff at least one 
constituent reason is a moral reason. Please note that this is logically equiva-
lent to the explanation given in (1) because, if one constituent reason is moral, 
all are moral because of the homogeneity of the reasoning. 
(3) The constituent reasons of a heterogeneous-ambivalent reason are of 
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different kinds and they are partly for and partly against the conclusion. (i) If 
A believes that future generations would suffer from climate change (which 
she disvalues intrinsically) and believes that tougher laws for cutting carbon 
emissions can prevent this change, she has a moral reason to endorse tough-
ening these laws. (ii) If she holds the additional view that stricter laws would be 
a financial burden to her, she has a non-moral reason against tightening up on 
these laws. Since one of A’s reasons is a moral reason but the other is non-
moral, her reasoning is heterogeneous; and since she has one reason for and 
another against tougher laws, her reasoning is ambivalent, that is, her reason-
ing is heterogeneous-ambivalent. 
As I now see it, complex reasoning of this kind is moral iff at least one con-
stituent reason is a moral reason. Though these reasons may be of different 
logical strength, it is not necessary that the stronger reason(s) must be moral. 
Even if the stronger reason is a non-moral reason, the reasoning should still 
count as moral reasoning. Let me briefly illustrate this. I am driving on a 
lonely road and meet a hitchhiker who wants a free ride. Since I know that the 
area is crime ridden, I feel uncomfortable with a stranger in my car and I thus 
have a strong non-moral reason against stopping. However, my reasoning is 
nevertheless moral if the stranger’s desire to hitch a lift counts for me intrinsi-
cally and provides me thus with a moral reason for giving him a lift. This may 
seem obvious, but let us now change the example. The person I meet on this 
lonely road is injured but my reason not to stop is still stronger than my rea-
son to help. We may now say that not giving him a lift is morally wrong, but 
this is not the point here. My complex reasoning still qualifies as moral rea-
soning as long as his plight counts for me intrinsically and provides me with a 
simple moral reason for helping. It is again essential not to confuse metaethi-
cal and normative ethical viewpoints. 
(4) Heterogeneous-equivalent reasoning consists of reasons that are of dif-
ferent kinds but are all for or against the conclusion. (i) Suppose A believes 
that people in developing countries especially would suffer from climate 
change, which she disvalues in itself, and that she is convinced that stricter 
laws could prevent this impending catastrophe. She then has a moral reason 
to support stricter laws against the emission of greenhouse gases. (ii) If A be-
lieves in addition that she may also personally suffer from the rise in tempera-
ture of the earth’s atmosphere, she has in addition a non-moral reason for en-
dorsing laws against these emissions. Since her reasons are heterogeneous and 
both are for stricter laws, her complex reason is heterogeneous-equivalent. 
Complex reasons of this kind are moral iff they do not consist only of non-
moral reasons. Whenever we reason for or against something, we can call it 
moral reasoning (in the metaethical sense) as long as at least one of our simple 
reasons is a moral reason, even if we have more non-moral reasons, and even 
if our non-moral reasons are stronger. 
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The question I have been addressing in this paper deals with what renders a 
reason someone has a moral reason. The answer, I have submitted, is that a 
simple moral reason is a reason that is socially grounded (in the explained 
sense) and a complex moral reason is a reason that contains at least one sim-
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